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I. INTRODUCTION
The era of biotechnology is upon us.' For ages, human beings have
manipulated natural phenomena to enhance their ability to feed
themselves, 2  but the recent development of recombinant DNA
technology has revolutionized this process. Now, through genetic
modification (GM) 3, researchers can cause one organism to express
genes from an altogether different organism. 4 The resulting genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) are already commonplace in American crop
fields5 and pave the way for incredibly exciting advancements in
agriculture, ranging from more productive fields that require less
pesticides to crops that produce biodegradable plastics or cheap
pharmaceuticals.6 Alongside these positive developments, however, are
a host of concerns focused primarily on the potential impact of this new
technology on the environment and human health.7  Although the
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1. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn. Public Health and Biopharming,
30 AM. J.L. & MED. 371,371 (2004) ("We have entered the biotech century.").
2. John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle to
Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207,
207(2001).
3. The acronym "GM" appears in this Comment to signify the term "genetic modification" as
well as the modifier "genetically modified." Organisms that are genetically modified are also
commonly called "genetically engineered," "transgenic," and "bioengineered." Gregory N. Mandel,
Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified
Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2175 (2004).
4. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 377.
5. Mandel, supra note 3, at 2177.
6. Id. at 2180-87.
7. Id. at2190-99.
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available scientific evidence so far has suggested that GM crops are
safe,8 the debate about the wisdom of their widespread use rages on.'
The purpose of this Comment is not to promote one side of the
debate over the other. It takes for granted that fundamental positions of
both camps are correct: 10 GM agriculture is the wave of the future, and
this future is uncertain. It also assumes that there are some fundamental
goals upon which everyone can agree." The question becomes how the
law can promote these goals. The current regulatory scheme covering
GMOs has been criticized as inefficient, incomplete, and inadequate to
adapt to advancements in agricultural biotechnology while addressing its
risks. 12 This Comment takes a different approach and asks whether the
patent law, through its requirement that inventions be "useful" to deserve
patent protection, can be an independent legal tool for advancing
important public policy regarding the next generation of agriculture. 13
Part II of this Comment illustrates modem American agriculture
through a representative examination of the highly prevalent practice of
growing com. It goes on to consider the history and potential of GM
technology. Part III then reviews the incentive system that patent law
creates and the basic requirements for obtaining a patent. In particular, it
explores the patent law's insistence that inventions be "useful" to receive
a patent, which is known as the utility requirement. Part IV proposes a
framework for the creation of a new heightened utility standard designed
to address the unique challenges of GM agriculture and considers the
limitations of such a proposal.
8. See generally Philip J. Dale et al., Potential for the Environmental Impact of Transgenic
Crops, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 567 (2002) (reporting scientific evidence about numerous
environmental concerns of GM crops); see also Mandel, supra note 3, at 2190 (reporting that "there
is no confirmed case of human disease or illness caused by genetically modified food").
9. See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Forced Feeding: New Legal Issues in the Biotechnology
Policy Debate, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37 (2005) (providing a "concise update of many of the
significant legal and policy issues shaping American law as relates to agricultural biotechnology").
10. Cf Mandel, supra note 3, at 2171 ("A review of the data and information available
concerning genetically modified products demonstrates that both camps are right, and wrong.").
11. These goals are embodied in the Criteria set forth in this Comment. See infra Part IV.B.
12. Mandel, supra note 3, at 2167.
13. It should be noted from the outset that this Comment's proposal need not apply exclusively
to GMOs in agriculture, or even to agriculture inventions in general. For the sake of simplified
discussion, and because of the heated debate surrounding the use of GMOs in agriculture, this
Comment focuses on inventions that relate to GM technology in crops.
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I. AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AND THE RISE OF GM TECHNOLOGY
A. A Case Study ofAmerican Agriculture: Corn
The first section of Michael Pollan's 2006 book The Omnivore's
Dilemma paints a detailed picture of the United States' intimate
relationship with corn' 4 and provides a representative glimpse into the
current state of American agriculture. As Pollan puts it, "[t]he great
edifice of variety and choice that is an American supermarket turns out to
rest on a remarkably narrow biological foundation comprised of a tiny
group of plants that is dominated by a single species: Zea mays, the giant
tropical grass most Americans know as corn."' 5  Corn is an obvious
ingredient in some products, such as corn on the cob, tortillas, muffins,
and chips, 16 but many other food and nonfood items derive from corn.,
7
Corn feeds cattle that become steak or produce dairy items, chickens that
lay eggs, and other animals we eat such as pigs, sheep, turkeys, catfish,
and tilapia.18 "Wet mills," which are a type of corn processing plant,
break corn down into its constituent parts--embryo, endosperm, and
fiber-and use them to make "innumerable" derivative products, such as
corn oil, cornstarch, citric and lactic acid, glucose, maltodextrine,
ethanol, xanthum gum, monosodium glutamate (MSG), and high-
fructose corn syrup.' 9 Thus, products derived from corn serve as the
building blocks that compose processed foods, such as chicken nuggets,
whose corn-dependent ingredients include not only the chicken itself, but
also corn flour, corn oil, leavenings, lecithin, mono-, di-, and
triglycerides, and golden coloring. 20  Corn even plays a role in the
production of many nonfood items, such as toothpaste, cosmetics,
diapers, trash bags, batteries, and the vegetable wax that gives some
supermarket produce its sheen. 2'
Corn is so prevalent in American agriculture at least in part because
it is among the cheapest ways to transfer energy from an acre of
farmland to human bodies through such forms as animal fat, sugar, or
14. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE'S DILEMMA 15-119 (2006).
15. Id. at 18.
16. See id. at 85 (noting that "most of the corn we eat as corn-whether on the cob, flaked, or
baked into muffins or tortillas or chips-comes from varieties other than [the lower quality variety
used for such purposes as animal feed and processing]").
17. Id. at 18-19.
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id. at 85-88.
20. Id. at 18.
21. Id. at 19.
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starch.22 During photosynthesis, corn creates compounds with four
carbon atoms.23 This trait places it among a small group of "C-4" plants
that can manufacture more organic matter and calories from the same
amount of sunlight, water, and basic elements than most other plants.
24
Additionally, corn's method of reproduction lends itself well to human
intervention: through hybridization, human beings "arrange [corn's]
marriages" and create breeds with particular traits, including adaptation
to a range of climates and stronger stalks and roots that can withstand
mechanical harvesting. 25  First generation (F-I) hybrid plants are
genetically identical to each other; no single plant has a competitive
advantage, so resources are shared equally, resulting in a "crowded
metropolis" of coM. 26 Whereas in 1920 the average corn yield per acre
was twenty bushels, today F-i hybrids can yield 180 bushels per acre,
which corresponds to about 10,000 pounds of food.27 Many corn farmers
now use the latest innovation in agricultural biotechnology, GM seeds,
28
which can increase crop yields even more.
The development of such a high-yielding and useful crop seems like
a positive advancement in agriculture, but various costs accompany the
corn monoculture. 29  For example, the monoculture enhances the
conversion of natural habitats into manmade farmland.3 °  Moreover,
monoculture has diminished agricultural diversity and, unlike alternative
practices like crop rotation that help maintain biodiversity and ecological
balance, monoculture plays a role in the extinction of wild species. 31 The
trend towards monoculture also raises concerns that are more social or
cultural in nature, as illustrated by farms in Iowa, where in the early
twentieth century farmers raised cattle, chickens, hogs, apples, hay, oats,
22. Id. at 108.
23. Id. at 21.
24. Id. at 21-22. Because of this "C-4 trick," corn plants end up with relatively more of the
isotope carbon 13; the proportion of carbon 13 in a person's flesh indicates how much corn is in his
or her diet. Id. at 22. According to a Berkeley biologist who has researched this phenomenon,
"North Americans look like corn chips with legs." Id. at 23.
25. Id. at 30, 37.
26. Id. at 31,37.
27. Id. at 36-37.
28. See id. at 36 ("As [one farmer] sees it, GMO seed is just the latest chapter in an old story:
Farmers eager to increase their yields adopt the latest innovation .... ).
29. Monoculture is the result of "intensive and continual farming of one type of crop or one
variety of seed on [one] plot of land." Mohsen Al Attar Ahmed, Monocultures of the Law: Legal
Sameness in the Restructuring of Global Agriculture, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 139, 143 (2006).
30. See, e.g., POLLAN, supra note 14, at 38 ("A mere 2 percent of [Iowa's] land remains what it
used to be (tall-grass prairie), every square foot of the rest having been completely remade by
man.").
31. Ahmed, supra note 29, at 146-47.
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potatoes, cherries, wheat, plums, grapes, and pears in addition to corn.
32
By the 1980s, corn largely pushed out other forms of agriculture as well
as many farmers: "One man can handle a lot more acreage by himself
when it's planted in monoculture, and without animals to care for he can
take the weekend off ....
The use of nitrate fertilizers necessary to obtain high crop yields
provides another set of environmental costs associated with the growing
of corn. 34 American farmers apply more fertilizer to corn than any other
crop.35 The production of artificial nitrate fertilizer requires heat and
pressure, usually supplied by fossil fuels; fertilizer for one acre of corn
requires about fifty gallons of oil. 36 Also, run-off from nitrate fertilizer
can pollute human drinking water 37 and natural ecosystems. 38 A wild
growth of algae as big as New Jersey resulting from run-off from the
Mississippi River has appeared in the Gulf of Mexico-a "dead zone"
for fish.39
Because of corn's biological characteristics, the "perverse economics
of agriculture," which do not follow the usual rules of supply and
demand, 40 and a history of governmental farm subsidies, American farms
grow a surplus of corn-a "plague of cheap corn.",4 1 One way to use
these cheap calories is to feed them to cows that can convert them into
protein.42 But cows have evolved to be grass eaters;43 feeding them corn
32. POLLAN, supra note 14, at 38.
33. Id. at 39-40.
34. See id. at 41-47 (describing the history and environmental implications of synthetic nitrate
fertilizer used to grow corn).
35. See id. at 41 ("Hybrid corn is the greediest of plants, consuming more fertilizer than any
other crop."); see also NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL
CHEMICAL USAGE: 2005 FIELD CROPS SUMMARY 8, 38, 56 (2006) (reporting 2005 use of fertilizer on
major U.S. crops by state).
36. POLLAN, supra note 14, at 44-45.
37. Id. at 46-47 (explaining how the city of Des Moines occasionally issues "blue baby alerts"
to warn parents that nitrogen levels in tap water are dangerously high for consumption by children).
38. See id at 47 ("The flood of synthetic nitrogen has fertilized not just the farm fields but the
forests and the oceans too .....
39. Id.
40. Id. at 48, 54. "'The economics of a family farm are very different than a firm's: When
prices fall, the firm can lay off people, idle factories, and make fewer widgets. Eventually the
market finds a new balance between supply and demand. But the demand for food isn't elastic;
people don't eat more just because food is cheap. And laying off farmers doesn't help to reduce
supply. You can fire me, but you can't fire my land, because some other farmer who needs more
cash flow or thinks he's more efficient that I am will come in and farm it. Even if I go out of
business this land will keep producing corn."' Id. at 54 (quoting George Naylor, an Iowa farmer).
41. Id.at47-54.
42. Id. at 71, 74.
43. Id. at 70. Although corn itself is a "grass," see supra note 15 and accompanying text, the
grasses that cows have evolved to eat are, for example, those native to the Great Plains, such as
2007]
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acidifies their digestive systems, necessitating the widespread use of
antibiotics like Rumensin and Tylosin and causing the development of
acid-resistant E. coli strains that are particularly threatening to humans.44
Another method of utilizing the corn surplus is to convert it into
processed foods via industrial processing plants. 45 This is an attractive
option to the food industry who can increase profits at a faster rate than
the finitely sized stomachs of consumers would otherwise allow by
creating value-added complex food systems from cheap raw materials.
46
Today processors can do hundreds of things with corn, the "cleverest" of
which is to refine it into high-fructose corn syrup.47  This cheap
sweetener "has insinuated itself into every corner of the pantry: not just
into our soft drinks and snack foods, . . .but into the ketchup and
mustard, the breads and cereals, the relishes and crackers, the hot dogs
and hams., 48  High-fructose corn syrup thus "gets [people] to really
chomp through the corn surplus.' 49  While most Americans do not
consider themselves big corn eaters, the average American consumes one
ton of corn every year. 50 This trend may play a role in a myriad of health
issues: obesity is now officially an epidemic, costing the health care
system some ninety-billion dollars per year; one out of every three
children born in 2000 will develop Type II diabetes (no longer called
"adult-onset" diabetes); and today's children may be the first generation
to have a shorter life expectancy than their parents.51
The model of corn production that Pollan illuminates is a
prototypical example of "industrial agriculture." 52 It evokes a handful of
western wheatgrass, little bluestem, green needlegrass, and buffalo grass. See id. at 69 (listing
grasses that a typical cow eats before journeying to the feedlot).
44. Id. at 78, 81-82. E. Coli is a "bacterium whose natural habitat is the feces of hoofed
animals." Robin Finn, A Public Health Doctor Caught Up in an E. Coli Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2006, at B4. Although human infections have traditionally been associated with hamburger
meat, "it is developing a habit of sneaking into the human food chain via vegetables," id, as
evidenced by the California-spinach-related outbreak in September 2006 that killed at least three
people and sickened more than two hundred and the subsequent outbreak initially linked to green
onions, and later shredded lettuce, at Taco Bell restaurants on the East Coast. Bruce Lambert,
Shredded Lettuce Is Now Chief Suspect in E. Coli Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, at B9;
Andrew Martin, With Focus Off Onions, E. Coli Hunt Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at B 1.
45. See POLLAN, supra note 14, at 85-90 (describing corn processing at "wet mills").
46. Id. at 94-95.
47. Id. at 103.
48. Id. at 104.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 85.
51. See id. at 101-02 (referencing these health problems and suggesting that one reason for
them is that "[w]hen food is abundant and cheap, people will eat more of it and get fat").
52. See, e.g., Ahmed, supra note 29, at 143-44 (describing industrial agriculture); see also
POLLAN, supra note 14, at 17 (characterizing the topic of his study as "the industrial food chain").
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environmental, social, and public health related issues whose underlying
causes are most likely numerous and complex. 53  Biotechnology, in a
broad sense, is the "use of living organisms to make new products," a
definition that includes such old-fashioned techniques as traditional plant
breeding or the use of bacteria to convert milk into yogurt.5 4 In this
broad sense, biotechnology has played an essential role in the emergence
of industrial agriculture: for example, the hybridization of different
varieties of corn boosted yields and enabled mechanical harvesting.55 A
narrower definition of biotechnology encompasses newer "artificial"
practices, with particular focus on recombinant DNA technology, in
contradistinction to older "natural" processes. 56 Biotechnology, in this
narrower sense, has already begun to reshape agriculture.57 The next
subpart of this Comment describes the next generation of biotechnology:
GM technology.
B. GM Technology: The Next Generation in Agriculture
1. A Brief History of GMOs and Their Integration into American
Agriculture
For thousands of years, human beings have selectively bred plants to
propagate characteristics that serve human needs.58 The work of Gregor
Mendel and Charles Darwin in the mid-nineteenth century began to
elucidate the mechanics of this process, and the actual mechanism, DNA,
was discovered by Watson and Crick in 1953. 59 In the early 1970s,
Stanley Cohen and Hubert Boyer accomplished the first successful use of
recombinant DNA technology when they successfully spliced a gene
from one organism and put it in another.6 ° Using this process, scientists
53. See, e.g., POLLAN, supra note 14, at 39 (acknowledging the importance of the tractor in the
development of modem corn farming).
54. Frederick H. Degnan, Legal Aspects ofFDA's Regulation of Food Biotechnology, SJ033
A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS 131, 133 (2003).
55. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
56. See Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology's [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become
Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2006, at 1-6 (explaining various meanings of the term
"biotechnology"). As used subsequently in this Comment, "biotechnology" tends to carry the
narrower meaning: "applied biological science (as bioengineering or recombinant DNA
technology)." WEBSTER'S NEW ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY 179 (2002); see also Noah, supra, at
2-3 (citing similar definition).
57. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
58. Applegate, supra note 2.
59. Id. at 207 & nn.2-3.
60. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 377.
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can defeat the limits of reproductive incompatibility of different species
and cause one species to express the particular traits of an altogether
different species.6 '
The United States Food and Drug Administration approved the first
GM product for human consumption in 1994, Calgene's Flavr Savr
tomato, which had delayed ripening characteristics to prolong shelf life.62
Since then, more than fifty GM crops have been commercialized in the
United States, where an estimated 70% of food in grocery stores contains
GM ingredients. 63 GM seeds became 40% of the corn, 81% of the
soybeans, and 73% of the cotton grown in the United States in 2003.64
Farmers in the United States planted over 130 million acres with GM
crops in 2006, which is an increase of over 11 million acres from 2005,
and more than any other country in the world.65 The use of GM crops, in
the United States and globally, is expected to continue to rise.
66
Two common GM crops are "Bt" corn and "Roundup Ready"
soybeans.67  Bt corn incorporates genetic material from Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt),68 a "naturally occurring ubiquitous soil bacterium that
produces a toxin lethal to certain insects., 69 For decades farmers have
sprayed Bt toxin over crops, but such topical application often loses its
effectiveness within days.70 By inserting the Bt gene into corn, the crop
itself continuously produces the Bt toxin in essentially every part of the
plant.71 Roundup Ready soybeans are genetically modified to tolerate
herbicides, which increases crop yield by making weed elimination
72easier.
61. See id at 377-78 ("Suddenly researchers could move genes from one species to another,
thus overcoming the reproductive limits imposed by sexual incompatibility among species."). For a
helpful explanation of the basic scientific procedure behind recombinant DNA technology, see In re
O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 895-99 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
62. Degnan, supra note 54, at 137.
63. Mandel, supra note 3, at 2176-77. Fritos corn chips, Coca-Cola, McDonald's french fries,
and Nestle's chocolates are some examples of common food items that contain GM ingredients. Id.
at 2177 n.20.
64. Id. at 2177.
65. CLIVE JAMES, INT'L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISTITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS,
Executive Summary to BRIEF 35: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2006,
at 5 (2006).
66. Id. at 8.
67. Holly Beth Frompovicz, Comment, A Growing Controversy: Genetic Engineering in
Agriculture, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 265, 267 (2006).
68. John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental Law of
Genetic Engineering, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 807, 810 & n. 15 (2001).
69. Dale et al., supra note 8, at 568.
70. Kunich, supra note 68, at 810.
71. Id. at810-11.
72. Frompovicz, supra note 67, at 267.
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2. Commonly Perceived Benefits and Costs of GMOs in Agriculture
Proponents of GM technology point to an array of potential benefits
of the technology, such as reaping higher crop yields more efficiently,
reducing irrigation, reducing herbicide and pesticide use, reducing crop
loss to pests, improving crop quality, and the targeting of only harmful
insects. 73 Advantages even include the creation of more nutritious crops
that can help combat world hunger: for example, Monsanto has produced
a GM rice, "golden rice," which contains high levels of beta carotene to
prevent vitamin A deficiency-related health problems.74 More "dazzling
possibilities" include plants that produce biodegradable plastics and
polyesters or drugs to treat various human diseases, 75 or plants that can
absorb toxic waste.76
On the other hand, critics of genetic modification fear an array of
potential dangers associated with the technology. These concerns
generally fall into three categories: risks to human health, risks to the
environment, and risks to agriculture. 77  Examples of human health-
related concerns include the risk that someone who consumes a GM food
product suffers an allergic reaction to an otherwise nonexistent protein in
the food; the risk that exposure to the high levels of "natural" pesticides
like Bt toxin could have adverse effects on some people, particularly in
the long term; and the fear that certain genes from GM crops with
antibiotic-resistance characteristics could be transferred to individuals
consuming those crops and ultimately reduce the effectiveness of
medical antibiotic treatment. 78  Environmental concerns range from
issues related to gene flow, whereby new genetic material from GM
crops could move into unintended organisms and create "superweeds"
that normal herbicides cannot control; to extinction of wild species
resulting from the invasion of nonindigenous GM crops into natural
habitats; to threats to insects and other animals that are susceptible to but
73. Id. at 268-69.
74. Id. at 269.
75. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 372. In March 2007, a biopharmaceutical company obtained
preliminary approval from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to grow, on 3000 acres of farmland in
Kansas, GM rice capable of producing human proteins that could be refined to create medicines to
fight diarrhea and other illnesses in children. Sam Hananel, USDA Approves Plan to Grow
Genetically Modified Rice in Kansas, YAHOO! FIN., March 2, 2007, http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/070302/
rice pharming.html?.v=2.
76. Frompovicz, supra note 67, at 269.
77. Matthew Rich, The Debate Over Genetically Modfied Crops in the United States:
Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 889, 894
(2004).
78. Id. at 894-95.
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not targeted by GMO-expressed pesticide; to potential increases in
herbicide residue in the environment or reduction in biodiversity
resulting from greater application of herbicides by farmers who know
their crops are herbicide-resistant. 79 Finally, risks to agriculture include
the economic costs to farmers who must keep up with increasing prices
in high-tech seeds and may face a smaller foreign market resulting from
international restrictions on GM imports.
The fear that GMOs endanger the environment found support in a
1999 study that found that larvae of the monarch butterfly were harmed
by eating milkweed dusted with Bt corn pollen, 81 and a 2001 report that
genetic material from GM corn had found its way into native varieties of
Mexican maize. 82  However, subsequent inquiry called the validity of
both of the studies into question.83 Since then, the available scientific
evidence has not supported the critics' fears regarding human health 84 or
environmental disaster,85 and farmers seem willing to plant GM crops
despite potential economic challenges. 86  Nonetheless, the debate over
the advisability of GMOs in agriculture continues because of at least one
detail that GM opponents can use to justify their position now and for
several years to come: the absence of long-term studies on GMO
impact.
87
The combination of the general lack of confirmed negative GM
consequences to date and the apparent acquiescence to the technology by
American farmers support the conclusion that GM crops will continue to
play an important, and likely increasing, role in American agriculture.
This point leads us to the crux of this Comment's quandary: how can we
ensure that GM technology brings about the benefits that proponents tout
rather than simply multiplying the profits of GM seed companies while
79. Mandel, supra note 3, at 2194-98.
80. Rich, supra note 77, at 898-99.
81. John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214, 214
(1999).
82. David Quist & Ignacio H. Chapela, Transgenic DNA Introgressed into Traditional Maize
Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414 NATURE 541-43 (2001).
83. Declan Butler, Alleged Flaws in Gene-Transfer Paper Spark Row Over Genetically
Modified Maize, 415 NATURE 948, 948 (2002); John Hodgson, Monarch Bt-Corn Paper Questioned,
17 NATURE BIOTECH. 627, 627 (1999).
84. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 3, at 2190 ("[I]t is important to note that there is no confirmed
case of human disease or illness caused by genetically modified food.").
85. See generally Dale et al., supra note 8 (reporting scientific evidence related to
environmental concerns of GM crops).
86. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (noting prevalence and increasing trend of
GM crop use in the United States).
87. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 77, at 895 ("Furthermore, the effects [on human health] of long-
term exposure [to GM food] are unknown.").
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continuing, or worse, exacerbating, the arguably dangerous food
production model that Michael Pollan's depiction of corn typifies?
C. Industrial Agriculture: Meet GMOs
Another set of potential costs and benefits associated with GMOs is
their capacity to affect the current industrial agricultural model. GM
technology in agriculture may pave the way for the amelioration of the
negative aspects of industrial agriculture, or it may open the door to a
new episode of industrial agriculture that is even less desirable than the
current model. To illustrate this fork in the road, one requires a more
precise definition of the negative aspects of industrial agriculture.
For purposes of illustration, three examples of the negative aspects of
industrial agriculture derived from Pollan's depiction of corn are helpful.
First, the monoculture decreases agricultural diversity, which is
undesirable because agricultural diversity promotes genetic variation and
ecological balance.88 Second, the monoculture requires the constant
input of chemical fertilizer.89  This is undesirable because chemical
fertilizer requires oil consumption and causes environmental damage. 90
Third, the monoculture is a key element in the creation of a surplus of
one type of crop (concededly, driven by forces well beyond merely
biotechnology). 9' This is undesirable because the methods of utilizing
this surplus, feeding it to cows or converting it into processed foods, lead
to risks to the environment and human health.
92
Many of the benefits of GMOs directly address these problems.
First, GM technology lends itself to application in any number of
organisms. 93 The development of more varieties of GM crops could lead
to an increase in agricultural diversity. Second, GMOs can require less
pesticide and can produce higher yields.94 One can logically conclude
that more efficient crop production per acre will permit freeing up of
fields for other purposes, such as conservation. The total usage of
fertilizer and other inputs thus may well decrease. Third, the problems
associated with the usage of crop surplus might be alleviated by novel
88. Ahmed, supra note 29, at 146-47.
89. Id. at 143; see also POLLAN, supra note 14, at 41-46 (describing nitrate fertilizer use on
corn).
90. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
93. See Degnan, supra note 54 ("Scientists can now easily transfer genes from one source into
bacteria, plants, or animals of totally different origin.").
94. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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GMOs. For example, one can imagine the development of a new GM
crop that could be used to feed cows but that does not cause the
acidification of their digestive systems like corn does.95
On the other hand, the introduction of GMOs into agriculture might
provide a method for industrial agriculture to become even more
"industrial." This hypothetical progression would result primarily from
the capacity of GMOs to grow crops more efficiently and easily. Thus,
although such a proposition is counterintuitive and seemingly absurd, the
agricultural model might have more negative impact thanks to increases
in efficiency. First, agricultural diversity might diminish yet further by
the development of particular GM crop varieties that serve the needs of
the food industry extremely well. In a worst case, if perhaps fanciful
scenario, every American farmer would cultivate a single variety of GM
crop that can grow under practically any condition and can be used for
any purpose. Second, although more efficient crop production would
appear to enable the freeing up of fields and resources for other purposes,
the result might alternatively be the use of "freed-up" fields for the same
purpose, growing GM crops, ultimately necessitating the use of more
inputs like chemical fertilizer. Third, this in turn could lead to an even
larger crop surplus that the food industry could find cost-effective, but
environmentally and socially expensive, methods of utilizing.
Although attempting to predict the effects that GM crops will have
on industrial agriculture requires a fair degree of speculation, the law
should anticipate the impact of new technology on the environment and
human well-being. The next subpart inquires into how the law currently
handles GM technology as a precursor to a discussion of whether the
patent law can serve as a tool for harnessing the potential of GMOs while
also addressing its various risks.
D. The Current Regulation of GMOs
A brief iook at the history and current strategy of GMO regulation is
appropriate before exploring the implications of modifications to patent
law. The rise of the use of recombinant DNA techniques in the early
1970s triggered public concerns, community bans on genetic research,
protests, and government discussions of the technology.96 Scientists
initially opted to self-regulate the technology in an effort to avoid
95. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
96. Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food
andAgriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 736 (2003).
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governmental regulation. 97 In 1975, a conference of scientists at the
Asilomar Conference Center in Pine Grove, California, led to a set of
guidelines, later adopted by the National Institutes of Health, which
helped quell public concerns and promote safe research. 98
The United States emerged as a leader in biotechnology by the
1980s, and the Reagan Administration was reluctant to discourage this
tendency. 99  Nonetheless, concerns about public health and
environmental safety accompanied the imminence of the creation of GM
foods' 00 and led to the recognition that regulation was necessary.1l°
Consequently, the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy promulgated a finalized version of the Coordinated Framework
for Regulation of Biotechnology in 1986.'02 The Coordinated
Framework specified that GM products were not inherently dangerous
and that their regulation would occur under existing statutes, which
became law decades before the advent of GM technology.10 3  This
decision indicates a belief that GM products are not significantly
different from their conventional counterparts. 0 4  Under the scheme
established by the Framework, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
regulates GMOs that become food or drugs, the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulates GMOs in relation to the
protection of existing crops, and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulates GM-related pesticide products. 105
The approach embodies the idea that GM technology is just the next
step in an age-old practice of breeding and selection. 0 6 One example is
the FDA's policy on GM Foods, which presumes that GM foods are
essentially the same as their non-GM counterparts. 0 7  Under the
authority of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act'0 8 the FDA
considers GM products to be food additives for purposes of regulation
97. Id. at 736-37.
98. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 378; Marden, supra note 96, at 737.
99. Marden, supra note 96, at 737.
100. Id.
101. Mandel, supra note 3, at 2216.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2167, 2216.
104. Id. at 2217.
105. Id. at 2216-17; Marden, supra note 96, at 739.
106. See Applegate, supra note 2, at 232 (noting that two major assumptions of the Coordinated
Framework reflect the idea "that GM technology is simply a continuation of existing breeding and
selection technology").
107. Id.
108. Mandel, supra note 3, at 2218 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2003)).
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because no provisions expressly cover GM foods.10 9  However,
substances that are "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS) are not
subject to FDA approval, and the manufacturer rather than the FDA
determines whether the substance is GRAS." 0 Because the FDA does
not view GM foods as substantially different, it does not require that GM
foods be labeled as such."'1
The details of the complex regulatory scheme currently covering GM
foods are beyond the scope of this Comment. 12 For our purposes, there
are two relevant points regarding regulation. First, the U.S. Congress
does not appear to be receptive to efforts to overhaul the existing
regulatory structure governing GMOs.1 3  Second, commentators argue
that the existing multiagency regulatory strategy is unsatisfactory to
optimally foster the advancement of GM technology while also
addressing its various risks. 1 4  Whatever the status and future of the
direct regulation of GMOs, there may be other legal tools for promoting
positive agriculture. One such tool is the patent law.
III. PATENT LAW: THEORY AND REQUIREMENTS
A. Theory Behind Patent Law: Incentive to Innovate
The United States Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." ' 5 Congress exercised this power
by creating the Patent Act (the Act)." 16 Section 101 of the Act provides:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2218-19.
Ill. Id. at2219.
112. For a comprehensive overview of the scheme, see generally Marden, supra note 96.
113. See, e.g., Debra M. Strauss, The International Regulation of Genetically Modilied
Organisms: Importing Caution into the U.S. Food Supply, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 167, 188 (2006)
("Congress does not appear to be supporting initiatives to address food safety concerns and to
tighten the regulatory process for bioengineered food in the United States.").
114. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 3, at 2258-59 (arguing that new regulation is required to
"optimally reap the potentially spectacular health, environmental, and economic benefits of [next-
generation] biotechnology advances" in order to prevent society from facing "inefficient costs and
delays and unnecessary risks").
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
116. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
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improvement there3f, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."' 17
The constitutional language providing for patents indicates that the
purpose of patents is to encourage inventors to innovate: Congress can
give exclusive rights over patents "to promote the Progress of ... useful
Arts." 11 8 The theory behind patents acknowledges that inventions are
expensive to create and difficult to control once they are available to the
public.119  Without patent protection, inventors would have little
incentive to spend resources coming up with and marketing new
products. 20  Thus, "[p]atent law provides a market-driven incentive to
invest in innovation, by allowing the inventor to appropriate the full
economic rewards of her invention."'
2'
However, the government does not hand out patents simply for the
sake of inventors.' 22  Rather, "the Constitution places the rewards to
inventors in a secondary role. It makes the public interest the primary
concern in the patent system."' 123  Given that patents exist to drive
innovation, but for the ultimate benefit of the public, this Comment
proposes that the public interest now demands a directed incentive to
innovate towards improving future agriculture.
B. Requirements of Patentability
An invention must satisfy five substantive requirements to
successfully receive patent protection from the Act: novelty,
nonobviousness, disclosure, patentable subject matter, and utility.124 The
novelty requirement limits patent protection to inventions that are truly
new, as analyzed under a set of technical rules. 25 The nonobviousness
requirement adds to this concept, requiring that the invention represent a
significant step forward in the inventive process, rather than a trivial
117. Id. § 101.
118. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
119. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
127 (4th ed. 2006).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (listing the purposes of
the patent system).
123. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
124. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000); MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 124; Andrew W.
Torrance, An Extinction Bar to Patentability 25 (Sept. 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
125. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 124, 185-86 (citing § 102). For a more detailed
description of the novelty requirement, see id. at 185-214.
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addition to existing technology. 26 The disclosure requirement seeks to
ensure that the public receives its end of the "patent bargain"; society
bears the costs of granting the inventor a monopoly over the invention
during the patent term in exchange for the benefits of innovation, but
only if the inventor provides a description of the invention sufficient to
enable "one of ordinary skill in the art" to make and use the invention as
soon as the patent term ends.
27
A fourth requirement, subject matter, addresses what types of
inventions may be patentable.128  The language of § 101 appears to
establish categories of patentable subject matter by limiting protection to
inventions that can be described as "process[es]," "machine[s],"
"composition[s] of matter," or improvements of those things. 29 The rise
of modem biotechnology, however, brought into question how strictly
patent examiners should follow these categories, particularly with respect
to inventions that involved living organisms. The Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty reviewed the patentability of a "human-made, genetically
engineered bacterium... capable of breaking down multiple components
of crude oil.' 130  The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) denied a patent on the grounds that microorganisms are
"products of nature" and that § 101 does not allow patenting of living
things. 131 The Supreme Court of the United States analyzed the language
of § 101: "In choosing such expansive terms as 'manufacture' and
'composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope."'
' 32
The Court held the scope of potentially patentable subject matter
includes "anything under the sun that is made by man."' 33 The Court
confirmed this interpretation in 2001: "'the relevant distinction was not
between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature,
whether living or not, and human-made inventions.'134
126. Id. at 124 (citing § 103). For a more detailed description of nonobviousness, see id. at 214-
38.
127. Id. at 124-25 (citing § 112); Torrance, supra note 124, at 25-26 (citing and discussing §
112).
128. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 128.
129. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
130. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
131. Id. at 306.
132. Id. at 308.
133. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923,
at 6 (1952) (Conf. Rep.)).
134. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) (quoting
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313).
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The Chakrabarty decision extends protection to nearly anything that
is not naturally occurring and can meet the other requirements of
patentability. When considering how this result might shape the
evolution of GM technology, a pressing question emerges: can we use
another patent-law mechanism to encourage the development of only
certain kinds of innovation?
C. Variations on Utility
The final requirement of patentability is utility. Section 101 requires
that inventions be "useful" to receive patent protection. 35 Indeed, the
Constitution itself, when granting Congress the power to promote the
progress of arts and sciences, limits such power to the progress of "useful
Arts."' 13 6 However, as the Supreme Court noted in Brenner v. Manson,
"a simple, every day word [like "useful"] can be pregnant with ambiguity
when applied to the facts of life."' 137 This statement opens the door to the
conclusion that whether an invention is useful depends on the type of
invention and the context in which the inventor is operating.'
38
1. Utility Doctrine in General
Without more constitutional or statutory language to offer guidance,
successive court decisions interpreting the meaning of "useful" have
fleshed out the utility doctrine, 139 although utility issues arise relatively
rarely during the examination process or infringement suits. 40 Decisions
that have used the utility requirement to reject patents have distinguished
three general varieties of utility: general utility, specific utility, and moral
utility.
141
General utility refers to the notion that the invention must address
some sort of human need or problem. 42 An 1890 treatise by Professor
135. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
136. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
137. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529 (1966).
138. Cf Nathan Machin, Comment, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility
Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CAL. L. REV. 421, 431 (1999) (noting, during a
discussion of the interpretation of utility carved out in Brenner, that the "amount and strength of
evidence necessary to prove that an invention is useful varies with the facts of each case").
139. See id. at 437 (identifying the three sources of the utility doctrine).
140. MERGES ETAL., supra note 119, at 144.
141. Id.; see also Machin, supra note 138, at 426 (characterizing moral utility as one
interpretation of general utility).
142. Machin, supra note 138, at 433.
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William Robinson provides an example of the subject matter that does
not meet this criterion: an invention that is "'a mere curiosity, a scientific
process exciting wonder yet not producing physical results, or [a]
frivolous or trifling article or operation not aiding in the progress nor
increasing the possession of the human race."",143 This warning has not
translated to a very stringent barrier to patentability, though; for example,
inventions whose only purpose is to entertain or amuse are "useful"
under the patent code. 144
The second category of utility, specific utility, applies to inventions
that take on a particular function and requires that the invention be able
to perform that function. 45  In other words, an invention is not
specifically useful if it does not actually work. 146 The classic example is
a patent application for a perpetual motion machine: unless an applicant
can rebut scientific evidence that such a feat is impossible, the USPTO
will deny a patent on such an invention for lack of specific utility. 47
Under these definitions, utility is usually not a terribly difficult
hurdle to overcome. 48 In 1966, the Supreme Court made a decision that
appeared to raise the hurdle in Brenner v. Manson.149  There, the
applicant sought a patent on a chemical process of making certain
steroids. 50 The PTO had rejected the application for lack of utility, even
though the application had referenced a scientific article revealing that
the steroids were undergoing investigation for potential tumor-inhibiting
uses and that they were chemically related to a class of steroids that were
proven to inhibit tumors in mice.15' The Court ultimately upheld the
rejection, noting that Congress did not intend for patents to cover
chemical products that are only really useful in the sense that scientists
can run tests on them in search of a useful application, and that chemical
processes are no different. 52 The Court memorably explained that "a
patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion."'
' 53
143. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 155 (quoting I W. ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 463 (1890)) (alteration in original).
144. Id. at 155-56; Machin, supra note 138, at 433.
145. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 156.
146. Machin, supra note 138, at 426.
147. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 156.
148. Machin, supra note 138, at 436.
149. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
150. Id. at 520.
151. Id. at 521-22 & n.3.
152. Id. at 535.
153. Id. at 536.
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Brenner perhaps represents the most stringent application of the
utility requirement. 14 Although its application has been limited 55 and
its rule is not easily extended by analogy, 56 Brenner stands for two
important propositions. First, it shows a capacity for the law to take the
utility requirement seriously. Second, it invokes the importance of the
utility requirement to the original purpose of the patent system, which is
to benefit the public: "The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the
benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial
utility.' ' 157 As one investigates the various meanings that courts have
derived from "useful," this observation becomes particularly relevant to
promoting improved GM agriculture.
2. Moral Utility
A third flavor of utility involves morality. Justice Story laid the
foundation of the moral utility doctrine in 1817 in Lowell v. Lewis
58
when he interpreted the meaning of "useful" as it appeared in the Patent
Act of 1790."59 In this infringement action involving an invention related
to the construction of pumps, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's
pump had to be "a better pump than the common pump" to be
"useful."' 6 ° Justice Story rejected this argument and explained: "All that
the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious
to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The word
'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to
mischievous or immoral.'' His examples of inventions flunking this
test included "a new invention to poison people, or to promote
debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination."'' 62  That same year,
Justice Story echoed these observations in another patent infringement
case: "[The law] simply requires, that [an invention] shall be capable of
154. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 149; see also Andrew R. Smith, Comment, Monsters at
the Patent Office: The Inconsistent Conclusions of Moral Utility and the Controversy of Human
Cloning, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 159, 168 (noting that the Brenner court "formulated what remains the
highest authority on the scope and purpose of patentable utility").
155. Machin, supra note 138, at 428-29.
156. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 149.
157. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
158. 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
159. Machin, supra note 138, at 435; Smith, supra note 154, at 164.
160. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019; Smith, supra note 154, at 164.




use, and that the use is such as sound morals and policy do not
discountenance or prohibit."
163
Justice Story was attempting to articulate a low utility bar to
patentability. 164 However, his language from Lowell appears in nearly all
the subsequent applications of the doctrine, striking down patents for
lack of moral utility.' 65 A series of cases in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries used the doctrine to invalidate patents on gambling
devices on the theory that gambling is immoral. 66 For example, the
court in National Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd held that a coin-
operated machine called "Toy Automatic Race-Course," whose sole
purpose was gambling in saloons, was not patentable.' 67  The court
explained: "it is not a useful device, within the meaning of the patent
law, as its use so far has been only pernicious and hurtful."'
' 68
As societal perceptions of morality changed and defining morally
acceptable inventions became more difficult, courts became less willing
to extend the moral utility doctrine. 6 9 The practice of invalidating
gambling machine patents stopped in 1977 with Ex parte Murphy.1
70
There, the USPTO Board of Appeals reviewed an examiner's decision to
reject a patent application for a slot machine for lack of patentable
utility.' 7' In reversing the rejection, the Board effectively ended an era of
applying the moral utility doctrine to gambling machines: "we think this
Office should not be the agency which seeks to enforce a standard of
morality with respect to gambling, by refusing, on the ground of lack of
patentable utility, to grant a patent on a game of chance if the
requirements of the Patent Act otherwise have been met."'
' 72
The Murphy court, in dicta, discussed another limitation of the moral
utility doctrine when it reviewed what it considered to be the "guiding
163. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217).
164. See Machin, supra note 138, at 436 ("Judicial misinterpretation of Judge Story's insightful
articulation of the utility requirement as shrill moralizing obscures his real message which is that the
marketplace is the ultimate arbiter of an invention's utility.").
165. Smith, supra note 154, at 164.
166. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Brewer
v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir. 1922); Nat'l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889)); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897).
167. 40 F. at 89-90; Smith, supra note 154, at 165.
168. Lloyd, 40 F. at 90.
169. Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent
Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 489 (2003).
170. 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 803 (1977).
171. Id.at801.
172. Id. at 803.
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principles" 173 of moral utility as set forth in a 1903 case, Fuller v.
Berger.174 The Fuller court discussed three possible tests to determine
the utility of a Colt revolver: first, "'by balancing the good functions
with the evil functions"'; second, by considering "'utility negatived by
the mere fact that the thing in question is sometimes injurious to morals,
or to health, or to good order"'; and third, by concluding that
"'everything [is] useful within the meaning of the law, if it is used... to
accomplish a good result, though in fact it is oftener used . . . to
accomplish a bad one."' 175 The Fuller court concluded, and the Murphy
court agreed, that the third test is the proper method of determining
moral utility; the relevant question is whether the invention is capable
"of 'serving any beneficial end."'' 176
In the fairly recent case Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to use the moral utility
doctrine to strike down a patent on a juice machine that displayed a
nonjuice liquid in a tank to deceive consumers into believing that the
juice was a "pre-mix" machine when in fact it was a "post-mix"
machine.177 The court reasoned that "[t]he fact that one product can be
altered to make it look like another is in itself a specific benefit sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility" and that "[t]he fact that
customers may believe they are receiving fluid directly from the display
tank does not deprive the invention of utility."
'' 78
Murphy and Juicy Whip represent a departure from the moral utility
doctrine, but they do not indicate its complete extinction. 179 Courts can
interpret both holdings narrowly. 80 The Murphy court's reasoning was
that it no longer had any basis on which to insist that gambling was
immoral, not that utility does not incorporate morality, and it limited its
holding to gambling-related morality.' 8' Likewise, the Juicy Whip court
declined to follow cases that invalidated patents over products that
imitated higher-quality versions of those products.18 2  The particular
173. Id. at 802.
174. 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903).
175. Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 802 (quoting Fuller, 120 F. at 275).
176. Id. (quoting Fuller, 120 F. at 275) (emphasis omitted).
177. 185 F.3d 1364, 1365-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
178. Id. at 1367.
179. See Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk
of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 685, 691 (2004) (arguing that the moral
utility doctrine is not "completely dead").
180. See Smith, supra note 154, at 187-88 (stressing that the purposes of the two challenged
patents became or were legal).
181. Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 803.
182. Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1367 (citing Scott & Williams v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003
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utility in Juicy Whip (making customers believe they are buying pre-
mixed juice) may represent a threshold beyond which the moral utility
doctrine still applies.' 83
3. USPTO Utility Guidelines
The USPTO promulgates the Manual of Patent Examination
Procedure (MPEP) as a reference of the practices and procedures it uses
during patent prosecution.' 84  One section of the MPEP creates
guidelines for patent examiners deciding whether an invention is useful
(Utility Guidelines). 185 Although these Utility Guidelines are not legally
binding, they "establish the policies and procedures to be followed by the
Office personnel in the evaluation of any patent application for
compliance with the utility requirement[]."'' 8 6  According to the
guidelines, the invention's asserted utility must be "specific, credible,
and substantial."' 187 Credible utility means that the invention must not be
farfetched, like a perpetual motion machine. 188 Specific utility, in this
context, requires that the asserted utility have a specific use. 8 9 The
USPTO training materials give the example of a gene sequence that can
be used to identify a disease; the Utility Guidelines require that the
applicant specify which disease the sequence identifies. 90 Substantial
utility excludes the notion of "throw-away utilities," such as using
transgenic mice as snake-food or using a complex invention as landfill.'19
This set of utility subrequirements is not necessarily a direct
reflection of the utility doctrine as it developed through successive
judicial interpretations of the word "useful." The current Utility
Guidelines were established in response to policy concerns regarding the
"fragmentation of individual ownership claims,"'9 2 whereby "[a]
(2d Cir. 1925); Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900)).
183. See Smith, supra note 154, at 188 (identifying one application of the moral utility doctrine
that might survive Juicy Whip).
184. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE, Foreword (8th ed., rev. 5, Aug. 2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/indext.htm [hereinafter MANUAL].
185. Id. § 2107(11).
186. Id. § 2107(1).
187. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 152 (quoting 2001 version of MANUAL, supra note 184,




191. Id. at 152-53 (quoting 2001 version of MANUAL, supra note 184, set forth in 8th edition at
§ 2107(11)(B)(i)).
192. Id. at 153.
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proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be stifling life-
saving innovations further downstream in the course of research."'
' 93
This premise stems from "the tragedy of the anticommons" theory: "In
an anticommons . . . multiple owners are each endowed with the right to
exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective
privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of
exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse-a tragedy of the
anticommons."' 94 The current formulation of the Utility Guidelines thus
illustrates "how large policy issues are often played out in the details of
patent rules and doctrines"' 95 and, specifically, how concerns about
scientific research can inform the interpretation of utility.
In summary, inventions must be "useful" in order to receive patent
protection. This requirement is consistent with the overall goal of the
patent system to benefit the public. On the whole, utility has been an
easy requirement to satisfy, so long as the invention gives something
back to the public and actually works. However, in cases like Brenner
and older cases that found gambling machines to be immoral, the utility
standard has been used to limit patentability for particular policy reasons.
Further, the current USPTO guidelines were adopted in response to
specific concerns about scientific research. The history and current
manifestation of the utility doctrine leave open the possibility of judicial
tailoring of the utility requirement to address the needs of agricultural
biotechnology.
IV. A NEW UTILITY STANDARD FOR GMO-RELATED AGRICULTURAL
INVENTIONS
So far, this Comment has visited a number of related concepts. First,
it revealed the United States' intimate relationship with corn to support
the notion that while technological developments have greatly expanded
the volume of agricultural output, this expansion comes with costs in the
form of decreased agricultural diversity, harm to the environment, fewer
farming jobs, human and animal health hazards related to using corn as
193. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Einsenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998), quoted in MERGES ET AL.,
supra note 119, at 153.
194. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx
to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). Merges et al. note, however, that recent empirical
studies do not really support the anticommons theory, suggesting that scientists are willing to share
their technologies even if they hold the right to exclude others. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at
153.
195. MERGES ET AL., supra note 119, at 153.
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feed, and unhealthy diets.' 96 Second, an examination of the history of
GMOs and their effects, good and bad, and a brief summary of the
regulatory scheme behind biotechnology prompted an analysis of patent
law's purpose and requirements.1 97 Having considered how the utility
requirement has received customized interpretation in the past and how
policy concerns about scientific research have already shaped the
USPTO Utility Guidelines, this Comment now proposes a heightened
utility standard for agricultural GMO patents. It will flesh out a basic
argument, distinguish which agricultural goals the patent law should
aspire to promote, explore possible methods of adopting such a standard,
and, finally, weigh countervailing considerations against the adoption of
the new utility requirement.
A. The Basic Argument
Admittedly, there are many contributing factors to the current state
of American agriculture that Michael Pollan's depiction of corn
represents; the introduction of GM technology is only one dimension of a
complicated industry.198 Nonetheless, GM technology will continue to
play a large role in the evolution of modem agriculture, 99 and the law
should anticipate its effects. GM technology poses opportunity for
immense improvements to agriculture as well as terrifying dangers.200
Whereas the current regulatory framework may or may not be an
adequate method of promoting the promise of GM technology while
protecting against its risks, 201 the patent system might be an independent
legal tool for advancing sound agricultural policy. If the theory behind
the patent system is to encourage inventors to innovate,20 2 then a guided
patent system can channel innovation in a positive direction. Judges and
patent examiners have in the past interpreted the meaning of one
requirement of patentability, utility, to accommodate the public
203 itrsinterest. The public interest in sound agriculture now compels such
treatment of GM-related inventions: GM inventions tending to have an
impact on agriculture should not be considered "useful" within the
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. See supra Parts I.B, I.C, I1.D, I11.
198. See, e.g., POLLAN, supra note 14, at 48-56 (discussing the history of the "perverse
economics of agriculture").
199. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Part 1l.B.2.
201. See supra Part 11.D.
202. See supra Part 11I.A.
203. See supra Part III.C.
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meaning of the useful Arts clause of the Constitution and § 101 of the
Patent Act unless they promote certain agricultural goals. As a result of
the adoption of such a standard, the biotechnology industry would
concentrate research and development in technology that is more likely
to be patentable, the very technology that promotes these goals. The
ultimate intended result would be an improved state of agriculture.
B. Criteria for Identifying "Useful" GMOs
An important step in creating a new utility standard is dissecting the
macroscopic issue GMOs present into concrete, distinct goals. This
subpart identifies three fundamental goals that patent examiners and
courts could incorporate into criteria (the Criteria) for judging whether
biotechnological inventions relating to agriculture meet the utility
requirement.
1. Sustainability
One of the most striking issues that the corn monoculture evokes,
and which GM technology can affect, is the idea of "sustainability." As
one commentator argues, "[t]he popular debate over the use of biotech
crops is, at its core, a debate over sustainability." 20 4  Just what
"sustainability" means, however, is not so evident. Sustainability can be
a vague and ambiguous concept.2 0 5 Authors have dedicated entire works
to finding a workable definition that minimizes ambiguities.20 6 The most
common definition appeared in 1987 in a report by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland Report):
sustainable development is "'development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs."' 20 7 From there, "the term has taken on a life of its
own, finding diverse expression in all manner of environmental treaties,
trade agreements, international aid programs, presidential council
reports, state and local planning schemes, corporate mission statements,
investment fund charters, NGO policy documents, and so on.,
208
204. Daniel M. Krainin, Biotech Crops, Biosafety Protocol: Genetically Modified
Sustainability?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2004, at 63, 63.
205. Sanford E. Gaines, Sustainable Development and National Security, 30 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 321,339 (2006).
206. Id. at 340.
207. Krainin, supra note 204 (quoting WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON
FUTURE (1987)).
208. Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L.
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The Brundtland definition provides a general guideline to start the
process of developing a sustainability criterion of practical use to patent
examiners and courts. As a general proposition, courts and the USPTO
should not consider inventions to be "useful" if, in enhancing the current
generation's ability to meet its agricultural needs, they are likely to
compromise future generations' ability to meet their own agricultural
needs. Likewise, an invention should be presumed to be "useful" if it
appears that it will improve future generations' ability to meet their
agricultural needs while simultaneously aiding the current generation's
agricultural needs. The challenge for judges or patent examiners will be
determining when a technology poses a risk of being unsustainable under
this definition.
One place the implementers of the new utility requirement might
turn for guidance in establishing a workable framework are the principles
embraced by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol),
an international treaty that regulates GM crops. 2° 9 Adopted in 2000 as
part of the United Nations' Convention on Biological Diversity, the
Cartegena Protocol became effective in 2003 and governs transportation
of GM products across borders of nations that are a party to it (a group
that does not include the United States).21° One commentator notes,
"[s]ustainable development is a fundamental unifying principle in... the
Cartagena Protocol. 211  Its objective is "to contribute to ensuring an
adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and
use of living modified organisms resulting from modem biotechnology
that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity. 2 i2 Importing the spirit of an agreement that many
nations in the world have ratified, a framework for deciding which
inventions will promote sustainability might reflect ideas from the
Cartagena Protocol.
Even if a workable definition of sustainability were developed, the
uncertainty surrounding how an invention would be put to commercial
use demonstrates one of the serious shortcomings of using the utility
requirement to promote a substantive outcome. This shortcoming was
REV. 2109, 2115 (2005).
209. Christina L. Richmond, Genetically Modified Crops in the Philippines: Can Existing
Biosafety Regulations Adequately Protect the Environment?, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 569, 576
(2006).
210. Krainin, supra note 204, at 66-67.
211. Id. at 67.
212. THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, CARTAGENA
PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY art. 1 (2000), available
at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf. A "living modified organism" is a
GMO that is capable of reproducing, such as a GM seed. Krainin, supra note 204, at 67.
1016 [Vol. 55
RETHINKING WHAT AGRICULTURE COULD USE
recognized by the court in Ex parte Murphy when it reviewed what it
regarded as the proper test for moral utility as laid out in Fuller v.
213Berger: whether the invention can be put to any beneficial use. For
example, imagine a new GM breed of corn that is engineered to produce
forty normally sized ears of corn per stalk; the plant is otherwise normal
except that its peculiar root system causes soil erosion at ten times the
normal rate. At first glance, the invention appears to flunk the
sustainability criterion: a judge reviewing the application for a patent on
such a GMO, and hearing evidence tending to show the above facts,
could reject the patent on the grounds that it is likely to deprive future
generations of the soil they require to meet their own needs. On the
other hand, the very same corn plant might be used in such a way as to
promote sustainability. Suppose, for example, a farmer, very concerned
about future generations' soil needs, decided to replace his conventional
corn growing practices with a system of raising the forty-eared corn plant
only in large greenhouses that prevented soil loss. Assuming the farmer
would only have had access to the new GMO as a result of the incentives
bestowed upon the inventor by a patent, a judge's decision to deny a
patent for the invention might end up actually frustrating the goal of
sustainability.
2. Environmental Health
While impacts on the environment represent one important aspect of
sustainability, the new utility requirement could seek to promote an
environmental health goal that is distinct from sustainability. Its focus
would not be how new inventions can ensure that future generations are
not deprived of the natural resources required to meet their needs, but
how to protect the environment in its natural state, free from the impact
of human beings. The wisdom of such a goal is embodied in the decision
of Congress to enact the Wilderness Act,214 which recognizes the
numerous benefits of protecting certain lands from the encroachment of
any influence of man.215 Following this reasoning, the patent system
could refuse to consider inventions that pose substantial risk to the well-
being of natural habitats as "useful" for purposes of patentability.
For example, assume that nitrate fertilizer runoff has been proven to
cause severe algae growth in the Gulf of Mexico and that such algae
213. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
214. 16U.S.C.§§ 1131-1136(2000).




growth is becoming larger and threatens to destroy the habitat of a rare
species of fish. Assume also that it can be shown that the above forty-
eared corn plant requires several times the normal amount of nitrate
fertilizer to grow, and that it is economically logical to raise the corn
despite the increased fertilizer costs. The courts and the USPTO could
choose to deny patent protection to such a GMO for lack of utility.
3. Public Health
A third goal that the utility requirement could encompass is the
straightforward notion that an agricultural system should not endanger
human health. Patent applications covering inventions whose purported
utility involves human consumption could be denied, unless the applicant
can show there is no substantial threat to public health, on the grounds
that such an invention is not "useful." In formulating a criterion that
judges an invention's potential impact on public health, it is necessary to
distinguish between the different types of risks that GMOs pose. For
example, as described above, the practice of growing huge amounts of
corn has amounted to an American diet consisting of high proportions of
processed foods and cheap calories like those coming from high-fructose
corn syrup. This diet may be responsible for the obesity epidemic in
America. Insofar as GMOs will enhance our ability to produce corn
efficiently, and provided that the processed food industry will absorb an
increased input of raw materials in its continual development of complex
food systems, GMOs may present a public health risk through their
indirect boost in the amount of unhealthy foods available to consumers.
However, this cause-and-effect chain is probably too attenuated to justify
the denial of a patent on utility grounds.
A more direct type of public health concern is that a GM food
ingredient itself will, by virtue of some physical difference between it
and its conventional counterpart, cause adverse health effects when
consumed. A study by the World Health Organization identified these
risks as including: "direct health effects (toxicity), tendencies to provoke
allergic reaction (allergenicity), specific components with toxic
properties, the stability of the inserted gene, nutritional impact," and the
risk that genes from GM foods "could transfer to bacteria in the
gastrointestinal tract or to cells of the body and cause negative health
effects," such as antibiotic resistance due to transfer of antibiotic-
resistant marker genes.216 Although the FDA is charged with protecting
216. Strauss, supra note 113, at 169-70.
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the public from such dangers, the new utility requirement could require
inventors to show that their inventions will not bring about such hazards
before awarding a monopoly over the technology.
B. Implementation
Assuming that tailoring the utility requirement is worthwhile, an
inherent challenge to such a proposal is implementing the change. How
does the patent law adopt a new utility standard? The government could
put the new standard into operation through the legislative, executive, or
judicial branch. This subpart inquires into methods of implementing a
utility requirement that limits patent protection to inventions meeting the
Criteria and explores one procedural issue that will need to be addressed.
1. Legislative
One way to implement a new utility standard would be for Congress
to simply enact a new statutory provision limiting patent protection to
inventions that meet the Criteria. This approach would have the
advantage of giving Congress the opportunity to explicitly list the criteria
it deems most important as a clear guide to patent examiners,
practitioners, researchers, and biotech companies that invest in GM
innovation.
This sort of legislative action would not be unprecedented. Congress
has specifically exempted from patent protection inventions that are
"useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic
energy in an atomic weapon." 217 Public policy concerns about GM
technology might also be a basis for statutorily limiting patent protection
to inventions that satisfy the Criteria, whether by declaring them outside
the scope of patentable subject matter or by more precisely defining
"useful."
2. Administrative
The USPTO is an administrative agency, established within the
Department of Commerce. 21 8 It has authority under the Patent Act to
establish regulations for the "conduct of [its] proceedings." 219 The
217. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a)(2000).
218. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
219. 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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USPTO could make regulations designed to ensure that the patents it
grants covering biotechnological inventions do not frustrate the purposes
of the Criteria. It might alternatively establish procedural advantages,
such as accelerated prosecution, for inventions that are likely to promote
the purposes of the Criteria.
Additionally, the USPTO promulgates the MPEP, the guide that
helps patent examiners make determinations regarding the patentability
of applicants' inventions. 220  The USPTO could revise the MPEP to
encourage examiners to scrutinize applications for their utility under the
new standard that incorporates the Criteria. The Utility Guidelines have
been adjusted in the past to meet the concerns of the scientific
community22 '-the USPTO thus has the capacity to adjust its literature to
reflect changes it deems necessary to carry out its office of granting
patents to "useful" inventions.
3. Judicial
Federal courts frequently encounter cases in which they must decide
whether a given invention deserves a patent.222 These decisions may
result from patent infringement suits223 or appeals by applicants
dissatisfied with the USPTO's denial of patent protection. 224 Utility is
one of the grounds on which judges can find a patent invalid. Facing
challenges to the utility of patented biotechnological inventions, courts
should take into account the public interest in promoting sustainable and
environmentally and publicly safe agriculture. In fact, one might even
argue that courts should have been reading the Criteria into the utility
requirement since Chakrabarty and the advent of GMO patents.
This interjection of public policy considerations by courts could take
two forms: (1) Invalidation of patents covering technology that poses a
serious risk of frustrating one or more of the Criteria, as shown by
evidence put on by the patentee and the USPTO (scientific studies,
expert-witness testimony, past problems with similar technology); (2)
Presumptive validation of patents that will likely promote the goals of
220. MANUAL, supra note 184.
221. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... ").
223. E.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
224. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 134, 141 (2000) (enabling applicants to appeal USPTO decisions to the
Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences or to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); 35
U.S.C. § 145 (2000) (enabling appeals of decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences to
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia).
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the Criteria, as shown by the same evidentiary factors. Future
Examination Guidelines, USPTO procedures, and court decisions would
reflect the change in the law based on precedent.
4. Burden of Proof
The Federal Circuit has articulated a two-step test for deciding
whether a patent applicant satisfies the utility requirement225: "the
[USPTO] has the initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct
assertion of utility in the disclosure. Only after the [USPTO] provides
evidence showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably
doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant to provide
rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the invention's
asserted utility.
226
One procedural challenge to modifying the utility requirement to
incorporate the Criteria is determining whether this framework should
still apply. Should the initial burden be on the applicant rather than the
USPTO? Moreover, what standard of proof should be required-for
example, "preponderance of the evidence" or "beyond a reasonable
doubt." Should the standard of proof be the same for each of the Criteria
or differ depending on the degree of uncertainty associated with each
Criterion? These are questions that the implementers of the new utility
requirement would need to address.
A "clear and convincing" standard, placed on the applicant, appears
to be an appropriate solution. The applicant, having spent resources to
research and develop the new technology, might be expected to have
greater access to information relevant to that technology's potential
impact on sustainability, the environment, and human health. Moreover,
it seems fair that, standing in a position to reap the benefits of a
monopoly over the invention, the applicant should bear the initial burden
of showing that the invention meets the Criteria. Finally, a "clear and
convincing" standard seems to catch the optimal gray area between a
standard that is too stringent and one that is too permissive. A "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard is likely too stringent in a field such as
biotechnology, where it is admittedly difficult to know what effects an
invention is going to have at the patent application stage. Likewise, a
225. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 749 (3d ed. 2004) (citing In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
226. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566 (citation omitted).
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"preponderance" standard may simply be too easy to satisfy, allowing
too many inventions that flunk the Criteria to receive patents.
D. Counterarguments and Drawbacks
An immediate argument against the necessity of a heightened GM
standard is that a patent merely creates a right to exclude, not an
"affirmative right to make, use, or sell anything. 2 27 Thus, even if an
inventor obtained a patent on an invention whose implementation would
clearly violate federal regulation, he would not be able to lawfully
exercise the invention. Why should we even need to redefine what is
"useful" at the patent stage, when later regulation will prohibit
undesirable uses of the invention? Moreover, why will market
economics not simply reject inventions that society does not find useful,
either because it does not meet one of society's needs or because society
finds it environmentally, medically, or morally repugnant?
Three responses meet these arguments. First, as for the later
protection of regulation, the current regulatory framework may not be an
adequate measure to protect against the unique harms of GM
technology.228 Second, the market alone is not a strong enough check
against potential harms of GM agriculture, because the consumer sits
several steps removed from the process by which his food is grown. The
average consumer may consistently buy cheap tortillas, produced
through unsound means, before more expensive ones produced through
more desirable means, perhaps even having the knowledge that the
reduction in price comes with environmental or social costs. Third,
regulation and economics do not necessarily provide direct incentive for
inventors to innovate. An inventor might spend time and money
inventing something, wholly unaware that it will later be found to violate
some regulation or that for unexpected reasons it will not sell. On the
other hand, the purpose of the patent law is to encourage invention, and it
follows that it has a more direct influence on why inventors act the way
they do. Finally, even if regulation and economics verge on adequacy, a
supplemental legal measure is called for when the stakes are as high as
they are.
A second possible objection to the new utility requirement is that it
flies in the face of language adopted by the Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip
from an 1880 Supreme Court case, Webber v. Virginia: "Congress never
227. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131 F.3d 1011, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
228. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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intended that the patent laws should displace the police powers of the
States, meaning by that term those powers by which the health, good
order, peace and general welfare of the community are promoted.,
229
This statement would seem to contradict the idea that the federal patent
law can consciously promote policy goals relating to sustainability, the
environment, and public health. However, this language appears in
dictum in a case that struck down a patent for reasons unrelated to the
concerns of GM agriculture. Moreover, it is not certain that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still find this language meaningful. Finally, the
decision to treat GMO-related inventions differently with respect to the
meaning of "useful" is not necessarily a displacement of state police
powers by the federal government. Rather, the federal government might
be simply exercising its authority under the Constitution to promote the
progress of those arts that it finds useful. The Framers could hardly have
foreseen the introduction of GM technology centuries ago when creating
the Constitution; it follows that what they meant by "useful" cannot have
a single definition over time. By choosing to qualify what may be
patented by inserting the word "useful," the Framers, as well as Congress
in drafting § 101 of the Patent Act, wanted to ensure that the
governmental resources required to issue and enforce patents were not
wasted on ones that did not benefit the public.230 The current proposal
extends this notion one step further, suggesting that the Framers would
not have wanted to squander patent resources on inventions that are very
likely to harm the public interest in agriculture.
A third drawback to the new utility requirement is that it might
reduce investment inputs into an industry that needs all the investment it
can get. Researching new technology is expensive,23 1 and by raising the
bar to patentability, some companies might be persuaded to spend their
money on other pursuits rather than face an uphill battle to get a patent.
On the other hand, some commentators argue that a narrow utility
requirement would benefit research by decreasing the number of research
tools that are tied up by patent rights.232 Also, although patents exist to
229. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 344, 347-48 (1880)).
230. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966).
231. See Philip G. Pardey et al., Creating, Protecting, and Using Crop Biotechnologies
Worldwide in an Era ofIntellectual Property, 6 MINN. J. L. So. & TECH. 213, 215 (2004) ("In 1995
about half a trillion U.S. dollars were invested in all public and privately financed science worldwide
.... .).
232. See, e.g., Teresa M. Summers, The Scope of Utility in the Twenty-First Century: New
Guidance for Gene-Related Patents, 91 GEO. L.J. 475, 497 (2003) ("A broad utility requirement
increases privatization of basic research tools, which deepens the thicket of ownership rights and
exponentially worsens transaction costs.").
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encourage inventors to invent, important goals in the safety and
maintenance of our food supply should play a role in the patent process.
In fact, the reduction in investment in undesirable technologies might be
offset by a resulting concentration of investment in desirable
technologies.
Fourth, raising the utility hurdle for agricultural inventions may
dissuade some decidedly noble uses of the invention, such as the
development of more nutritious rice or crops that can grow in otherwise
barren, hungry nations. It must be remembered, however, that nothing is
to stop these inventions from getting patents if they can meet the Criteria.
If they cannot, their benefits are not worth their costs to sustainability,
the environment, or public health. If they can meet the Criteria, then the
new utility requirement will have placed us in a position of having our
cake and eating it too.
The biggest limitation to the implementation of a new, more
stringent utility requirement is its feasibility and the aforementioned
problem that arose when considering that inventions can be used in more
than one manner. Is it really possible to know, at the patent-granting
stage, or even after the fact, how a newly developed invention will
impact the sustainability, the environment, and public health? Can we
really expect patent examiners to be able to determine whether a GMO
will frustrate one of the Criteria when the invention might be
alternatively used in a way that promotes the Criteria? Can a judge hear
evidence about a technology, together with information about an
environmental harm, and make a factual conclusion that the technology
is responsible for the harm, and that the invention's patent should
therefore be invalidated? These are difficult questions to answer.
Some guidance is found in the fact that the Federal Circuit was
established in part to develop an expertise in a technical field of law,
patents.233 This specialized review system might be able to wade its way
through the difficult issues as the doctrine evolved. Also, each invention
could be treated differently. When the consequences of the invention's
implementation were too uncertain to say for sure, courts and the USPTO
could err on the side of patentability. In other cases, the effects of an
invention would be more certain, and the system would be able to
confidently make a utility determination.
233. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989) (reviewing the history and jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit).
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V. CONCLUSION
Two constants of being human are the need to eat and the ability to
invent. Throughout the course of human history, human beings have
developed better and more complex ways of feeding themselves. It is
this drive that led to the creation of a corn monoculture, where one plant,
corn, is an integral ingredient of hundreds of food items. Our innovative
instinct has most recently culminated in an accomplishment that
generations before might have never imagined possible: the expression
of traits of one species in an altogether different species. This feat is
exciting, because it holds the potential to improve upon some of our past
mistakes, but it is also worrisome, because it might lead to a whole new
set of deeper, uglier mistakes. Although there may be challenges that
defeat the practicality of modifying the traditional utility requirement, the
legal system should consider adopting a new standard of utility that
drives biotechnological innovation where we want it to go.
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